This article examines the funding of bank supervision in the context of the dual banking system. Since 1863, commercial banks in the United States have been able to choose to organize as national banks with a charter issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or as state banks with a charter issued by a state government. The choice of charter determines which agency will supervise the bank: the primary supervisor of nationally chartered banks is the OCC, whereas state-chartered banks are supervised jointly by their state chartering authority and either the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve). 1 In their supervisory capacity, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve generally alternate examinations with the states.
The choice of charter also determines a bank's powers, capital requirements, and lending limits. Over time, however, the powers of state-chartered and national banks have generally converged, and the other differences between a state bank charter and a national bank charter have diminished as well. Two of the differences that remain are the lower supervisory costs enjoyed by state banks and the preemption of certain state laws enjoyed by national banks. The interplay between these two differences is the subject of this article. Specifically, we examine how suggestions for altering the way banks pay for supervision may have (unintended) consequences for the dual banking system.
For banks of comparable asset size, operating with a national charter generally entails a greater supervisory cost than operating with a state charter. National banks pay a supervisory assessment to the OCC for their supervision. Although state-chartered banks pay an assessment for supervision to their chartering state, they are not charged for supervision by either the FDIC or the Federal Reserve. A substantial portion of the cost of supervising state-chartered banks is thus borne by the FDIC and the Federal Reserve. The FDIC derives its funding from the deposit insurance funds, and the Federal Reserve is funded through
The current funding system is a matter of concern because-with fewer characteristics distinguishing the national bank charter from a state bank charter-chartering authorities increasingly compete for member banks on the basis of supervisory costs and the ways in which those costs can be contained. Furthermore, two recent trends in the banking industry have been fueling the cost competition: increased consolidation and increased complexity. Consolidation has greatly reduced the number of banks, thereby reducing the funding available to the supervisory agencies, while the increased complexity of a small number of very large banking organizations has put burdens on examination staffs that may not be covered by assessments. Together, these three factors-the importance of cost in the decision about which charter to choose, the smaller number of banks, and the special burdens of examining large, complex organizations-have put regulators under financial pressures that may ultimately undermine the effectiveness of prudential supervision. Cost competition between chartering authorities could affect the ability to supervise insured institutions adequately and effectively and may ultimately affect the viability of the dual banking system.
The concern about the long-term viability of the dual banking system derives from changes to the balance between banking powers and the costs of supervision. If the balance should too strongly favor one charter over the other, one of the charters might effectively disappear. Such a disappearance has already been prefigured by events in the thrift industry.
The next section contains a brief history of the dual banking system and charter choice, explaining why the cost of supervision has become so important. Then we examine the mechanisms currently in place for funding bank supervision, and discuss the two structural changes in the banking industry that have fueled the regulatory competition. Next we draw on the experiences of the thrift industry to examine how changes in the balance between powers and the cost of supervision can influence the choice of charter type. Alternative means for funding bank supervision, and a concluding section, complete the article.
A Brief History of the Dual Banking System and Charter Choice
Aside from the short-lived exceptions of the First Bank of the United States and the Second Bank of the United States, bank chartering was solely a function of the states until 1863. Only in that year, with the passage of the National Currency Act, was a federal role in the banking system permanently established. The intent of the legislation was to assert federal control over the monetary system by creating a uniform national currency and a system of nationally chartered banks through which the federal government could conduct its business. 2 To charter and supervise the national banks, the act created the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The act was refined in 1864 with passage of the National Bank Act.
Once the OCC was created, anyone who was interested in establishing a commercial bank could choose either a federal or a state charter. The decision to choose one or the other was relatively clear-cut: the charter type dictated the laws under which the bank would operate and the agency that would act as the bank's supervisor. National banks were regulated under a system of federal laws that set their capital, lending limits, and powers. Similarly, state-chartered banks operated under state laws.
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When the Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913, national banks were compelled to become members of the Federal Reserve System; by contrast, state-chartered banks could choose whether to join. Becoming a member bank, however, meant becoming subject to both state and federal supervision. Accordingly, relatively few state banks chose to join. The two systems remained largely separate until passage of the Banking Act of 1933, which created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Under the act national banks were required to obtain deposit insurance; state banks could also obtain deposit insurance, and those that did became subject to regulation by the FDIC. 3 The vast majority of banks obtained federal deposit insurance; thus, although banks continued to have their choice of charter, neither of the charters would relieve a bank of federal oversight.
As noted above, over the years, the distinctions between the two systems greatly diminished. During the 1980s, differences in reserve requirements, lending limits, and capital requirements disappeared or narrowed. In 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act gave the benefits of Federal Reserve membership to all commercial banks and made all subject to the Federal Reserve's reserve requirements. In 1982, the Garn-St Germain Act raised national bank lending limits, allowing these banks to compete better with state-chartered banks. Differences continued to erode in the remaining years of the decade, as federal supervisors instituted uniform capital requirements for banks.
As these differences in their charters were diminishing, both the states and the OCC attempted to find new ways to enhance the attractiveness of their respective charters. The states have often permitted their banks to introduce new ideas and innovations, with the result these institutions have been able to experiment with relative ease. Many of the ideas thus introduced have been subsequently adopted by national banks. In the early years of the dual banking system, for example, state banks developed checkable deposits as an alternative to bank notes. Starting in the late 1970s, a spate of innovations took root in statechartered banks: interest-bearing checking accounts, adjustable-rate mortgages, home equity loans, and automatic teller machines were introduced by state-chartered banks. During the 1980s the states took the lead in deregulating the activities of the banking industry. Many states permitted banks to engage in direct equity investment, securities underwriting and brokerage, real estate development, and insurance underwriting and agency. 4 Further, interstate banking began with the development of regional compacts at the state level. 5 At the federal level, the OCC expanded the powers in which national banks could engage that were considered "incidental to banking." As a result, national banks expanded their insurance, securities and mutual fund activities.
Then in 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) limited the investments and other activities of state banks to those permissible for national banks and the differences between the two bank charters again narrowed. 6 In response, most states enacted wildcard statutes that allowed their banks to engage in all activities permitted national banks. 7 3 While most states subsequently required their banks to become federally insured, some states continued to charter banks without this requirement. Banks without federal deposit insurance continued to be supervised exclusively at the state level. After the savings and loan crises in Maryland and Ohio in the mid-1980s, when state-sponsored deposit insurance systems collapsed, federal deposit insurance became a requirement for all state-chartered banks. 4 For a comparison of state banking powers beyond those considered traditional, see Saulsbury (1987) . 5 Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the states began permitting bank holding companies to own banks in two or more states. State laws governing multistate bank holding companies varied: some states acted individually, others required reciprocity with another state, and still others participated in reciprocal agreements or compacts that limited permissible out-of-state entrants to those from neighboring states. In 1994, Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which removed most of the remaining state barriers to bank holding company expansion and authorized interstate branching. See Holland et al. (1996) . 6 As amended by FDICIA, Section 24 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1831a) makes it unlawful, subject to certain exceptions, for an insured state bank to engage directly or indirectly through a subsidiary as principal in any activity not permissible for a national bank unless the FDIC determines that the activity will not pose a significant risk to the funds and the bank is in compliance with applicable capital standards. For example, the FDIC has approved the establishment of limited-liability bank subsidiaries to engage in real estate or insurance activities. 7 For a discussion of the legislative and regulatory changes affecting banks during the 1980s and early 1990s, see FDIC (1997) , 88-135.
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Most recently, competition between the two charters for member institutions has led the OCC to assert its authority to preempt certain state laws that obstruct, limit, or condition the powers and activities of national banks. As a result, national banks have opportunities to engage in certain activities or business practices not allowable to state banks. 8 The OCC is using this authority to ensure that national banks operating on an interstate basis are able to do so under one set of laws and regulations-those of the home state. In this regard, for banks operating on an interstate basis, the national bank charter offers an advantage since states do not have comparable preemption authority. (In theory, however, nothing prevents two or more states from harmonizing their banking regulations and laws so that state banks operating throughout these states would face only one set of rules.) Thus, the OCC's preemption regulations reinforce the distinction between the national and state-bank charters that characterizes the dual banking system.
Funding Bank Supervision
The gradual lessening of the differences between the two charters has brought the disparities in the fees banks pay for supervision into the spotlight as bank regulators have come under increased fiscal pressure to fund their operations and remain attractive choices. How bank supervision is ultimately funded will have implications for the viability of the dual banking system. It has always been the case that most state bank regulators and the OCC are funded primarily by the institutions they supervise, 9 but it used to be that differences in the fees paid by banks for regulatory supervision were secondary to the attributes of their charters. Now, however, the growing similarity of attributes has made the cost of supervision more important in the regulatory competition between states and the OCC to attract and retain member institutions. This competition has tempered regulators' willingness to increase assessments and has left them searching for alternative sources of funding that will not induce banks to switch charters. The question for state bank regulators and the OCC, then, is how to fund their operations while remaining attractive charter choices in an era of fewer but larger banks. Here we summarize the funding mechanisms currently in place, and in a later section we discuss alternative means for funding bank supervision.
The OCC's Funding Mechanism
In the mid-1990s, after charter changes by a number of national banks, 10 the OCC began a concerted effort to reduce the cost of supervision, especially for the largest banks. The agency instituted a series of reductions in assessment fees and suspended an adjustment in its assessment schedule for inflation. 11 When the inflation adjustment was reinstated in 2001, it was applied only to the first $20 billion of a bank's assets. In 2002, the OCC revised its general assessment schedule and set a minimum assessment for the smallest banks. These changes reduced the cost of supervision for many larger banks, while increasing the cost for smaller banks-thus, making the assessment schedule even more regressive than previously. For example, national banks with assets of $2 million or less faced an assessment increase of at least 64 percent, while larger banks experienced smaller percentage increases or actual reductions in assessments.
8 On January 7, 2004, the OCC issued two final regulations to clarify aspects of the national bank charter. The purpose cited was to enhance the ability of national banks to plan their activities with predictability and operate efficiently in today's financial marketplace. The regulations address federal preemption of state law and the exclusive right of the OCC to supervise national banks. The first regulation concerns preemption, or the extent to which the federally granted powers of national banks are exempt from state laws. State laws that concern aspects of lending and deposit taking, including laws affecting licensing, terms of credit, permissible rates of interest, disclosure, abandoned and dormant accounts, checking accounts, and funds availability, are preempted under the regulation. The regulation also identifies types of state laws from which national banks are not exempt. A second regulation concerns the exclusive powers of the OCC under the National Bank Act to supervise the banking activities of national banks. It clarifies that state officials do not have any authority to examine or regulate national banks except when another federal law has authorized them to do so. See OCC (2004b OCC ( , 2004c .
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The OCC charges national banks a semiannual fee on the basis of asset size, with some variation for other factors (see below). The semiannual fee is determined by the OCC's general assessment schedule. As table 1 and figure 1 show, the marginal or effective assessment rate declines as the asset size of the bank increases.
The marginal rates of the general assessment schedule are indexed for recent inflation, and a surcharge-designed to be revenue neutral-is placed on banks that require increased supervisory resources, ensuring that well-managed banks do not subsidize the higher costs of supervising lesshealthy institutions. The surcharge applies to national banks and federal branches and agencies of foreign banks that are rated 3, 4, or 5 under either the CAMELS or the ROCA rating system. 12 For banking organizations with multiple national bank charters, the assessments charged to their non-lead national banks are reduced. 13 In 2004, these general assessments provided approximately 99 percent of the agency's funding. 14 The remaining 1 percent was provided by interest earned on the agency's investments and by licensing and other fees. As indicated in note 9, the OCC does not receive any appropriated funds from Congress. To illustrate the differences in the supervisory assessment fees charged by the OCC and the states, we calculated approximate supervisory assessments for two hypothetical banks, one with $700 million in assets and one with $3.5 billion. We used assessment schedules for the OCC and four states-Arizona, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and South Dakota-whose assessment structures are representative of the different types of assessment schedules used by the states. Like the OCC, Arizona and North Carolina use a regressive assessment schedule and charge assessments against total bank assets; however, neither makes any adjustment based on bank risk. Arizona's assessment schedule makes finer gradations at lower levels of asset size than does North Carolina's schedule. Massachusetts uses a risk-based assessment schedule in which assessments are based on asset size and CAMELS rating. Banks are grouped as CAMELS 1 and 2, CAMELS 3, and CAMELS 4 and 5. Within each CAMELS group there is a regressive assessment schedule so that banks are charged an assessment based on total bank assets. South Dakota charges a flatrate assessment against total bank assets.
The results are shown in Source: CSBS (2002) and OCC (2002) . Note: The calculation of assessments for state-chartered banks is based on rate schedules provided by the states to CSBS. Where applicable, the assessment is calculated for a CAMELS 1-or 2-rated bank.

The Effect on Regulatory Competition of Changes in the Banking Industry
Cost competition between state regulators and the OCC, and among state regulators themselves, has been fueled by two important structural changes that have occurred in the banking industry over the past two decades. The number of bank charters has declined, largely because of increased bank merger and consolidation activity, and the size and complexity of banking organizations has increased.
The first change-a decline in the number of charters-means that the OCC and state regulators are competing for a declining member base.
As we have seen, the cost of supervision remains one of the few distinguishing features of charter type. In ways that we explain below, the declining member base puts an additional constraint on the regulators' ability to raise assessment rates, even in the face of rising costs to themselves.
The second important structural change of the past two decades-the increasing complexity of institutions-also complicates the funding issue, for it may impose added supervisory costs that are not reflected in the current assessment schedules. As explained in the previous section, the OCC and most states currently charge examination fees on the basis of an institution's assets, but for a growing number of institutions, that assessment base does not reflect the operations of the bank.
The Net Decline in the Number of Bank Charters
The net decline in the number of banking charters since 1984 has resulted from two main factors. One is the lifting of legal restrictions on the geographic expansion of banking organizations-a lifting that provided incentive and opportunity for increased mergers and consolidation in the banking industry-and the other is the wave of bank failures that occurred during the banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 16 Until the early 1980s, banking was largely a local business, reflecting the limits placed by the states on intra-and interstate branching. The passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 imposed a consistent set of standards for interstate banking and branching on a nationwide basis. 20 With the widespread lifting of the legal constraints on geographic expansion that followed, bank holding companies began to consolidate their operations into fewer banks. Bank acquisition activity also accelerated.
Bank failures took a toll on the banking industry as well, reaching a peak that had not been seen since the Great Depression: from 1984 through 1993, 1,380 banks failed. 21 Mergers and acquisitions, however, remained the single largest contributor to the net decline in banking charters. Overall, the number of banks declined dramati- 
The Growth of Complex Banks
During the 1990s, we have seen the emergence of what are termed large, complex banking organizations (LCBOs) and the growth of megabanks 
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owned by these organizations. 25 In 1992, 90 banks controlled one-half of industry assets; by the end of the decade, the number of banks that controlled one-half of industry assets had shrunk to 26, and at year-end 2004 to 13. 26 These large banks engage in substantial off-balance-sheet activities and hold substantial off-balance-sheet assets. As a result, existing assessment schedules based solely on asset size have become less-accurate gauges of the amount of supervisory resources needed to examine and monitor them effectively.
Because of their size, geographic span, business mix (including nontraditional activities), and ability to rapidly change their risk profile, megabanks require substantial supervisory oversight and therefore impose extensive new demands on bank regulators' resources. In response, supervisors have created a continuous-time approach to LCBO supervision with dedicated on-site examiners-an approach that is substantially more resource-intensive than the traditional discrete approach of annual examinations used for most banks.
For example, the OCC-through its dedicated examiner program-assigns a full-time team of examiners to each of the largest national banks (at year-end 2004, the 25 largest). In size, these teams of examiners range from just a few to 50, depending on the bank's asset size and complexity. The teams are supplemented with specialists-such as derivatives experts and economists-who assist in targeted examinations of these institutions. 27 Like the trend toward greater consolidation of the industry, the trend toward greater complexity leads us to question the adequacy of the funding mechanism for bank supervision. The need for additional resources to supervise increasingly large and complex institutions, combined with the regulators' limited ability to raise assessment rates given their concerns with cost competition, creates a potentially unstable environment for banking supervision. If regulatory competition on the basis of cost should yield insufficient funding, the quality of the examination process might suffer.
To ensure the adequacy of the supervisory process, the potential for a funding problem must be addressed. In addressing this issue, however, the possibility for other unintended consequences must not be overlooked. In particular, solutions to the funding problem could bring into question the long-term survivability of the dual banking system. In the next section we look at a lesson from the thrift industry to illustrate this problem.
Funding Supervision: Lessons from the Thrift Industry
The history of the thrift industry shows how the choice of charter type can be influenced by changes in the tradeoff between the powers conferred by particular charters and the cost of bank supervision, and what that implies for the viability of the dual banking system. Like the commercial banking industry, the thrift industry also operates under a dual chartering system. States offer a savings and loan association (S&L) charter; some states also offer a savings bank charter. At the federal level, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) offers both a federal S&L charter and 25 LCBOs are domestic and foreign banking organizations with particularly complex operations, dynamic risk profiles and a large volume of assets. They typically have significant on-and off-balance-sheet risk exposures, offer a broad range of products and services at the domestic and international levels, are subject to multiple supervisors in the United States and abroad, and participate extensively in large-value payment and settlement systems. See Board (1999). The lead banks within such organizations form a class of banks termed megabanks. Like their holding companies, they are complex institutions with a large volume of assets-typically $100 billion or more. See, for example, Jones and Nguyen (2005 37 The OTS, like the OCC, bases its fees on an institution's asset size, and uses a regressive assessment schedule. Until January 1999, the OTS general assessment schedule based assessments on consolidated total assets. The assessments for troubled institutions were determined by a separate "premium" schedule. Both schedules were regressive: as asset size grew, the marginal assessment rate declined. In January 1999, the assessment system was revised and assessments were based on three components: asset size, condition, and complexity. Two schedules implemented the size component-a general schedule for all thrifts, and an alternative schedule for qualifying small savings associations. The condition component replaced the premium schedule; and the complexity component set rates for three types of activities-trust assets, loans serviced for others, and assets covered in full or in part by recourse obligations or direct credit substitutes. Rates were adjusted periodically for inflation, and other revisions were introduced. Effective July 2004, the OTS implemented a new assessment regulation that revised how thrift organizations are assessed for their supervision. Examination fees for savings and loan holding companies were replaced with a semiannual assessment schedule, and the alternative schedule for small savings institutions was eliminated. The stated goal was to better align OTS fees with the costs of supervision. See OTS (1990 OTS ( , 1998 OTS ( , and 2004 . 38 In the following discussion and in the notation to figures 3, 4 and 6, we use "OTS-regulated" as a proxy for federal regulation that was conducted by the FHLBS for the years before 1990 and has been conducted by the OTS starting in1990. 
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Analysis of the Demise
The demise of the state-chartered/OTS-regulated S&L was probably inevitable after the special powers enjoyed by these institutions were eliminated, as their cost of supervision was higher than that of federally chartered S&Ls. 
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Charter Choice-Maintaining an Attractive Charter
The narrowing of differences in state and national bank charters has both simplified the process of choosing a bank charter and focused greater attention on how to remain a viable charter choice. For bankers, charter choice is now generally a question of whether the higher assessment cost associated with a national charter is offset by the benefits of operating under a single set of laws and regulations-the OCC's preemption authority. For bank regulators, charter choice entails working to contain the cost of supervision and finding alternative ways to make charters attractive.
For the public, the competition between federal and state bank regulators to offer an attractive charter and the choices that banks ultimately make will affect them in a number of ways. Concerns will be raised about the dual banking system's ability to generate adequate funding (and therefore whether there is an effective level of prudential supervision, especially in an era of larger and more complex banks). Concerns will also be raised about how consumer protection and other laws affected by preemption are applied and enforced. Ultimately, concerns will be raised about the long-term viability of the dual banking structure and whether such a system is still relevant. 41
Switching Charters-A State Responds
The recent experience of New York shows the effects of the decision to switch charters on the chartering authorities. In July 2004, J. P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Bank One Corporation merged. The result was a combined company that had over one trillion dollars in assets, five banking charters (four national and one state), and operations in all 50 states. In November 2004, the charter of the lead bank, J. P. Morgan Chase Bank ($967 billion in assets), was converted to a national bank charter. As a result, the State of New York Banking Department (NYBD) lost significant revenue from supervisory assessments. In addition, HSBC Holding PLC had converted the New York charter of its lead bank, HSBC Bank USA ($99 billion in assets), to a national charter in July 2004. Together, the assessment revenue from J. P. Morgan Chase Bank and HSBC Bank USA had accounted for approximately 30 percent of the NYBD's operating budget. 42 Before the loss of these two banks, the NYBD had already been working to change its funding mechanism. An NYBD study had found that statechartered banks, which represented 10 percent of their state-licensed institutions, were carrying the department's entire budget. 43 The NYBD found it necessary to revise its assessment schedule and expand its assessment base. Effective with the 2005 fiscal year, the assessment base was revised to include all licensed and regulated financial institutions. For the first time, financial institutions other than banks paid annual fees for supervision in addition to any exam and licensing fees. The NYBD is also considering revising its charter to make it more attractive to banks and thrifts.
In an attempt to modernize, the NYBD proposed the adoption of a wild-card statute that would convey federal bank powers to banks chartered in New York. 44
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charter in 1994. Beginning in 1995, the OCC instituted a series of reductions in assessment fees and suspended the inflation adjustment factor in its 1995 assessment schedule. It continued to lower total assessments in 1996, and then in 1997, the OCC implemented a restructured assessment schedule to more accurately differentiate among banks and the resources they were likely to require in an examination. The number of national banks that switched charters declined after 1994, remaining at about 10 per year, until 2001 when the number again jumped. 45 The conversion of J. P. Morgan Chase Bank to a national charter cited above also poses issues for the OCC. The charter switch brought additional assets under the OCC's supervision, and subsequently increased the agency's supervisory burden. The OCC indicated that additional supervisory resources would be focused on the risks posed by and across business lines. It planned to hire additional examiners and to increase its specialized supervisory skills in areas such as derivatives and mortgage banking-areas in which J. P. Morgan Chase Bank is highly active. 46 Revenues from the assessments paid by the bank will offset these increases in supervisory costs. However, whether the revenues will be enough is problematic as a one-to-one relationship does not necessarily exist between costs and revenues in the assessment schedule.
Approaches to Funding Bank Supervision
Following the increase in the number of banks switching charters in 2001, then Comptroller of the Currency, John D. Hawke Jr., began a series of speeches calling for reform of the bank supervisory funding system. Arguing that the viability of the dual banking system should not rest on the maintenance of a federal subsidy for state-chartered banks, he proposed that a new approach to the funding of bank supervision be found. 47 That new approach should "strengthen both the federal and state supervisory processes, protect them from the impact of random structural changes, and ensure that all supervisors, state and national, have adequate, predictable resources available to carry out effective supervisory programs." 48
Passing the Cost through the Deposit Insurance Funds
Specifically, Hawke argued that if the costs of bank supervision were passed through the deposit insurance funds (for example, if the interest earned on the deposit insurance funds were used to pay for all bank supervision), the subsidy provided to state-chartered banks at the expense of national banks could be eliminated and at the same time an adequate source of funding for bank supervision could be ensured. 49 For this result to be achieved, all costs for bank supervision (costs of the states and the OCC) or some or all of the OCC's supervisory costs would have to be covered. In either case, the federal subsidy (that is, the national-bank subsidy) to state-chartered banks for the cost of bank supervision would be eliminated. The effect on the dual banking system is less clear. Once the states and the OCC were no longer competing for member banks on the basis of cost, the state charter might become relatively less attractive.
To discover the effects of funding total supervisory costs for the states and the OCC through the 45 For a discussion of reasons behind charter switches see Whalen (2002) and Rosen (2005) . 46 American Banker (2005) . 47 Because state-chartered banks do not pay for federal supervision whereas nationally chartered banks do, it is argued that state-chartered banks are effectively subsidized by nationally chartered banks through the assessments that the latter pay to the deposit insurance funds. See Hawke (2000 Hawke ( , 2001 and Rhem (2004) . 48 See Hawke (2001) . 49 Work on this article was completed prior to passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, which will merge the two deposit insurance funds. A variation on the above proposal would have the FDIC rebate to national banks-or through the OCC for pass-through to national banks-an amount equal to its contribution to the cost of state-bank supervision. Although the case can be made that nationally chartered banks have subsidized the FDIC's supervision of state-chartered nonmember banks, it would be difficult to calculate the precise size of that subsidy. An accurate accounting of the share of the deposit insurance fund(s) attributable to national banks would necessarily have to account for both premiums paid into the funds and the relative expense to the funds of national bank failures.
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deposit insurance funds, we performed a sensitivity analysis of four large banks-two regulated by the OCC and two by the states-and an average community bank. The immediate effects would be twofold. First, the operating expenses of the FDIC would increase, which in turn would cause the reserve ratio-the ratio of the deposit insurance fund balance to estimated insured depositsto be lower than it otherwise would be. Second, the assessment base for supervisory costs would be changed from assets to domestic deposits because deposit insurance premiums are assessed against domestic deposits. The incidence of the supervisory assessment would shift, falling more heavily on institutions funded primarily by domestic deposits. In other words, relying on the deposit insurance funds to cover the cost of bank supervision would change the basis on which supervision is paid and would therefore alter the allocation of cost among banks.
First we calculated the asset-based fee paid by these banks for supervision in 2002 (the latest date for which state assessment data were available). For the average community bank, we calculated this cost for three chartering authorities-the OCC, Georgia, and North Carolina. For 2002, the supervisory costs of the states and the OCC totaled approximately $698 million. 50 If the FDIC had paid the cost of supervision for the OCC and the states through the deposit insurance funds, the five banks would have borne the cost on the basis of their domestic deposits rather than assets. To understand the effect that changing the assessment base could have on individual banks, we assumed that the total cost of supervision ($698 million) would be passed on to the banks. Under this scenario, a flat-rate premium assessment of 1.9 basis points (bp)-or about 2/100ths of a percent-of domestic deposits would be required. 51
As Third, the deposit insurance funds were designed for other purposes and therefore passing all supervisory costs through the funds would obscure the purpose of the funds.
Other Approaches to Funding Bank Supervision
Although Hawke's approach focuses on funding bank supervision through the use of the deposit insurance funds, other approaches exist. One suggestion would be to fund bank supervision through the Federal Reserve, another would be to alternate examinations between the OCC and the other federal regulators, and a third approach would be to develop an assessment schedule for bank examination at the federal level. These approaches are briefly discussed below.
50 The costs for the OCC represent supervisory and regulatory costs as reported for 2002. To obtain approximate supervisory and regulatory costs for the states, we computed from the OCC data an average cost per $1 million of assets and then applied that to the assets represented by state banks. See OCC (2003a). 51 In this scenario, it is assumed that supervisory costs would be funded in the same manner as shortages in the deposit insurance funds are currently handled. That is, the costs of supervision would be funded through a flatrate assessment or surcharge that is levied against the assessable depositstotal (adjusted) domestic deposits-of each insured institution. The effect would be to replace the current regressive assessment system with a flat-rate assessment levied against domestic deposits. Modifications to this system could be made, if desired; however, in the interest of simplicity, we did not attempt to make any adjustments for bank risk or size. Proponents argue that the imposition of federal fees would end the federal subsidy of state-chartered banks. Opponents argue that the proposal would damage the dual banking system by eliminating one of its few remaining differences. Proposals to impose federal fees on state-chartered banks for their federal supervision have often been included in the annual federal budget process but Congress has routinely rejected them.
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Conclusion
As the powers of state-chartered and national banks have converged, the number of reasons for a bank to choose either a state or a federal charter has declined. One of the few remaining differences between the charters is cost. In the competition between regulators for institutions, therefore, the cost of supervision has assumed greater importance, and in this area, state-chartered banks have the advantage. State-chartered banks generally pay lower exam fees, at least partly, because the federal agencies-FDIC or Federal Reserve-alternate examinations with the states and these federal agencies do not charge for exams. The OCC, and national banks, in contrast, must cover the full costs of bank examinations.
The thrift experience demonstrates how the choice of charter type can be influenced by changes in the balance between powers and the cost of supervision. When differences in the powers of state-and federally chartered savings and loans disappeared, the proportion of S&Ls with state charters changed dramatically. Many converted from an S&L charter to a savings bank charter. In states where this was not an option, the number of state-chartered S&Ls declined dramatically, almost disappearing.
Currently the higher supervisory assessments for national banks are offset by the preemption benefits that they enjoy. Conversely, state-chartered banks do not receive the benefits of preemption, but their supervisory costs are lower. As the situation is developing, the OCC is becoming the regulator of large, complex banks-banks that are likely to have an interstate presence and benefit from preemption. Smaller, more traditional banks continue to find the state charter attractive. Although both charters remain viable, a bifurcation within the dual banking system appears to be developing. 53 If either of these components is materially changed, then banks-like state-chartered S&Ls -may be induced to switch charters. The result may be to undermine the dual banking system.
Before any modification is made to the structure for funding bank supervision, a public-policy debate should be undertaken. Supervisors need a funding mechanism that reflects not only the costs they incur to supervise banks but also proves to be a stable source of funding in the long term.
To this end, a number of proposals have addressed this issue. Each may provide a solution to the funding problem. However, given the few differences that remain between the bank charters, any change in the funding mechanism will affect the viability of the dual banking system. If the dual structure of the banking system still serves a purpose, then its disappearance should not be an unintended consequence.
52 The FDIC engages in many activities currently included in its supervisory budget that are required for both its role as deposit insurer and its role as primary federal supervisor. The complete separation of these functions might be neither possible nor practical. 53 See Jones and Nguyen (2005) . n Additional hourly fees: None.
The Funding of Bank Supervision
n Fee-sharing agreements: Not permitted by the state.
n Agreements to share examiner resources: Not permitted by the state.
n Rebate authority: None.
Source: CSBS (2002).
n South Dakota Assessment Fee Structure n Semiannual assessment of 2.5 cents per $1,000 of total assets;
n Nondepository banks pay an additional $500 semiannually.
n Examination fees and supervisory assessments are set by the Banking Board and by statute. The Division of Banking's total budget is appropriated by the South Dakota legislature. Expenditures are approved by the Director of Banking. Assessments are levied semiannually.
n Additional hourly fees: None.
n Fee-sharing agreements: Permitted by the state;
agreements are in place with Minnesota and North Dakota.
n Agreements to share examiner resources: Permitted by the state; agreements are in place with Minnesota and North Dakota.
North Carolina Assessment Fee Structure
Annual assessment based on asset size. 
For assets The assessment is
South Dakota Assessment Fee Structure
Semiannual assessment of 2.5 cents per $1,000 of total assets;
Nondepository banks pay an additional $500 semiannually.
